Accident; analysis and prevention
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Night shift workers are at risk of road accidents due to sleepiness on the commute home. A brief nap at the end of the night shift, before the commute, may serve as a sleepiness countermeasure. However, there is potential for sleep inertia, i.e. transient impairment immediately after awakening from the nap. ⋯ SP-Fatigue and driving performance did not differ significantly between conditions. In conclusion, the pre-drive nap showed objective, but not subjective, evidence of sleep inertia immediately after awakening. The 10-min nap did not affect driving performance during the simulated commute home, and was not effective as a sleepiness countermeasure.
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Sleep-related (SR) crashes are an endemic problem the world over. However, police officers report difficulties in identifying sleepiness as a crash contributing factor. One approach to improving the sensitivity of SR crash identification is by applying a proxy definition post hoc to crash reports. ⋯ When interpreting crash data it is important to understand the implications of SR identification because strategies aimed at reducing the road toll are informed by such data. Without the correct interpretation, funding could be misdirected. Improving sleepiness identification should be a priority in terms of both improvement to police and proxy reporting.
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In the military or emergency services, operational requirements and/or community expectations often preclude formal prescriptive working time arrangements as a practical means of reducing fatigue-related risk. In these environments, workers sometimes employ adaptive or protective behaviours informally to reduce the risk (i.e. likelihood or consequence) associated with a fatigue-related error. These informal behaviours enable employees to reduce risk while continuing to work while fatigued. ⋯ Rather, they have evolved spontaneously as part of the culture around protecting team performance under adverse operating conditions. When compared with previous similar studies, aviation personnel were more readily able to understand the idea of fatigue proofing than those from a fire-fighting background. These differences were thought to reflect different cultural attitudes toward error and formal training using principles of Crew Resource Management and Threat and Error Management.