Journal of health economics
-
This paper examines the impact of coverage on demand for health insurance in the Medicare Advantage (MA) insurance market. Estimating the effects of coverage on demand poses a challenge for researchers who must consider both the hundreds of benefits that affect out-of-pocket costs (OOPC) to consumers, but also the endogeneity of coverage. These problems are addressed in a discrete choice demand model by employing a unique measure of OOPC that considers a consumer's expected payments for a fixed bundle of health services and applying instrumental variable techniques to address potential endogeneity bias. The results of the demand model show that OOPC have a significant effect on consumer surplus and that not instrumenting for OOPC results in a significant underestimate of the value of coverage.
-
Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. ⋯ It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms' gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials.
-
The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) was designed to spur the development of drugs for rare diseases. In principle, its design also incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to develop drugs for "rare" subdivisions of more prevalent diseases. ⋯ I also find that 10-percent of the innovation in subdivided disease drugs induced by the ODA would have been conducted without the policy. While modest in size, this inefficiency suggests that agency problems should be considered when designing innovation policy.
-
A whiplash is a sudden acceleration-deceleration of the neck and head, typically associated with a rear-end car collision that may produce injuries in the soft tissue. Often there are no objective signs or symptoms of injury, and diagnosing lasting whiplash-associated disorders (WAD) is difficult, in particular for individuals with mild or moderate injuries. This leaves a scope for compensation-seeking behaviour. ⋯ This suggests that moderate injuries tend to be chronic, and that compensation-seeking behaviour is not the main explanation for this group. We find that claimants with chronic WADs used more health care in the year prior to the whiplash than claimants with non-chronic cases. This suggests that lower initial health capital increases the risk that a whiplash causes persistent WAD.
-
The empirical literature that explores whether physicians respond to financial incentives has not definitively answered the question of whether physicians alter their treatment behavior at the margin. Previous research has not been able to distinguish that part of a physician response that uniformly alters treatment of all patients under a physician's care from that which affects some, but not all of a physician's patients. To explore physicians' marginal responses to financial incentives while accounting for the selection of physicians into different financial arrangements where others could not, I use data from a survey of physician visits to isolate the effect that capitation, a form of reimbursement wherein physicians receive zero marginal revenue for a range of physician provided services, has on the care provided by a physician. Fixed effects regression results reveal that physicians spend less time with their capitated patients than with their non-capitated patients.