Consciousness and cognition
-
Empirical descriptions of the phenomenology of meditation states rely on practitioners' ability to provide accurate information on their experience. We present a meditation training protocol that was designed to equip naive participants with a theoretical background and experiential knowledge that would enable them to share their experience. ⋯ Each of these effects was better predicted by features of participants' daily practice than by desirable responding. Our results provide evidence that novice practitioners can reliably report their experience along phenomenological dimensions and warrant the future investigation of this training protocol with a longitudinal design.
-
Research has shown that people ascribe more responsibility to morally bad actions than both morally good and neutral ones, suggesting that people do not attribute responsibility to morally good actions. The present work demonstrates that this is not so: People ascribe more free will to morally good than neutral actions (Studies 1a-1b, Mini Meta). ⋯ Free will judgments for morally good actions were similarly driven by affective responses (i.e., reward desires, moral uplift, and perceived generosity), but also more pragmatic considerations (perceived utility of reward, counternormativity of the action, and required willpower). Morally good actions may be more carefully considered, leading to generally weaker, but more contextually sensitive free will judgments.
-
The feeling of effort is familiar to most, if not all, humans. Prior research shows that the feeling of effort shapes judgments (e.g., of agency) and decisions (e.g., to quit the current task) in various ways, but the proximal causes of the feeling of effort are not well understood. ⋯ In both experiments, difficult tasks increased the feeling of effort; however, this effect could not be explained by concurrent increases in physiological effort. To explain these findings, I suggest that the feeling of effort during mental activity stems from the decision to exert physiological effort, rather than from physiological effort itself.
-
The deterioration of sensory-motor integration within the pain matrix in patients with chronic Disorders of Consciousness (DoC) is one of the principal mechanisms responsible for non-conscious pain perception. The present study aimed to assess whether the variability in the inter-peak interval (IPI) between the N2 and P2 components of laser evoked potentials (LEP) could represent an objective marker of the behavioral responsiveness to nociceptive stimulation, as measured by the Nociception Coma Scale-Revised (NCS-R), and regardless of the sensory part of pain processing. We found that only IPI variability showed a significant correlation with NCS-R score, independently of the stimulation intensity (that influences the sensory part of pain processing). It was thus concluded that IPI variability might represent an objective measure of pain processing, which may help clinicians in the development of effective pain management strategies.
-
Is love possible if we are not free? Some philosophers consider that true love is necessarily free, while others think that the nature of love makes it incompatible with a certain type of freedom. Here, we explored the relationship between feelings of passionate love, belief in free will and determinism across three online studies. ⋯ Finally, Study 3 (N=309) confirmed the relationship between belief in free will and passionate love but not between belief in determinism and passionate love. These findings, along with a meta-analysis, suggest that both beliefs in free will and determinism are compatible with passionate love.