Consciousness and cognition
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Previous research suggests that anticipating pain at a particular body location prioritizes somatosensory input at that location. The present study tested whether this prioritization effect is limited to somatosensory information (modality-specific hypothesis) or generalizes to other sensory modalities (multisensory hypothesis). Thirty-four students performed tactile and visual Temporal Order Judgment (TOJ) tasks while either expecting a painful stimulus on one of the hands (threat), or expecting no pain stimulus (control). ⋯ Analyses revealed that only in threat trials, participants became aware of stimuli on the threatened hand more quickly as compared to the neutral hand, replicating the prioritization effect. Of particular interest, this effect was not different between the tactile and visual conditions. This suggests that the anticipation of pain results in multisensory prioritization of information at the threatened body location.
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Little is known about how people characterise and classify the experience of déjà vu. The term déjà vu might capture a range of different phenomena and people may use it differently. We examined the description of déjà vu in two languages: French and English, hypothesising that the use of déjà vu would vary between the two languages. ⋯ However, the same is not true in English. In an online questionnaire, we found equal rates of déjà vu amongst French and English speakers, and key differences in how the experience was described. As expected, the French group described the experience as being more frequent, but there was the unexpected finding that they found it to be more troubling.
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The rubber hand illusion shows that people can perceive artificial effectors as part of their own body under suitable conditions, and the virtual hand illusion shows the same for virtual effectors. In this study, we compared a virtual version of the rubber-hand setup with a virtual-hand setup, and manipulated the synchrony between stimulation or movement of a virtual "effector" and stimulation or movement of people's own hand, the similarity between virtual effector and people's own hand, and the degree of agency (the degree to which the virtual effector could be controlled by people's own movements). Synchrony-induced ownership illusion was strongly affected by agency but not similarity, which is inconsistent with top-down modulation approaches but consistent with bottom-up approaches to ownership. However, both agency and similarity induce a general bias towards perceiving an object as part of one's body, suggesting that ownership judgments integrate various sources of information.
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Rubber-hand and virtual-hand illusions show that people can perceive body ownership for objects under suitable conditions. Bottom-up approaches assume that perceived ownership emerges from multisensory matching (e.g., between seen object and felt hand movements), whereas top-down approaches claim that novel body parts are integrated only if they resemble some part of a permanent internal body representation. ⋯ This finding is inconsistent with top-down approaches and amounts to an existence proof that non-corporeal events can be perceived as body parts if their changes are systematically related to one's actions. It also implies that previous studies with passive-stimulation techniques might have underestimated the plasticity of body representations and put too much emphasis on the resemblance between viewed object and real hand.
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In the present study, we examined the impact of verbal instruction during extinction of human fear-conditioning. We extended the study of Raes, De Houwer, Verschuere, and De Raedt (2011) by controlling for context conditioning and recording unconditioned stimulus expectancy online in a within-subject design. ⋯ The results demonstrated that both the expectancy of an aversive outcome and conditioned skin conductance were significantly increased for the conditioned stimulus targeted by the instruction. Thus extinction was reversed by the concurrent presence of an alternative cause for the absence of the unconditioned stimulus.