Psychonomic bulletin & review
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Comment
Interpreting confidence intervals: A comment on Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, and Wagenmakers (2014).
Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, and Wagenmakers (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 21(5), 1157-1164 2014) reported the results of a questionnaire designed to assess students' and researchers' understanding of confidence intervals (CIs). They interpreted their results as evidence that these groups "have no reliable knowledge about the correct interpretation of CIs" (Hoekstra et al. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 21(5), 1157-1164 2014, p. 1161). We argue that their data do not substantiate this conclusion and that their report includes misleading suggestions about the correct interpretations of confidence intervals.
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Our recent meta-analysis concluded that training on working memory can improve performance on tests of fluid intelligence (Au et al., Psychon Bull Rev, 22(2), 366-377, 2015). Melby-Lervåg and Hulme (Psychon Bull Rev, doi: 10.3758/s13423-015-0862-z ) challenge this conclusion on the grounds that it did not take into consideration baseline differences on a by-study level and that the effects were primarily driven by purportedly less rigorous studies that did not include active control groups. ⋯ The present report demonstrates that evidence of impact variation by the active/passive nature of control groups is ambiguous and also reveals important discrepancies between Melby-Lervåg and Hulme's analysis and our original meta-analysis in terms of the coding and organization of data that account for the discrepant effect sizes. We demonstrate that there is in fact no evidence that the type of control group per se moderates the effects of working memory training on measures of fluid intelligence and reaffirm the original conclusions in Au et al., which are robust to multiple methods of calculating effect size, including the one proposed by Melby-Lervåg and Hulme.
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The present study investigates the effect of practice in a psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm on the backward compatibility effect (BCE), in order to determine the locus of this response priming effect on Task1 performance. In two experiments, we show that the size of the BCE is closely associated with the duration of the response selection stage in Task1. ⋯ Subsequently increasing the duration of Task1 response selection results in a larger BCE, but manipulating the same stage in Task2 does not. Our results suggest that the BCE reflects crosstalk of unattended response information for Task2 acting on the response selection stage in Task1, and that response information for two tasks may be activated simultaneously.
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The present study reveals that Election Day differentially affects the color preferences of US Republicans and Democrats. Voters' preferences for Republican red and Democratic blue were assessed, along with several distractor colors, on and around the 2010 interim and 2012 presidential elections. On non-Election Days, Republicans and Democrats preferred Republican red equally, and Republicans actually preferred Democratic blue more than Democrats did. ⋯ These results are consistent with the hypothesis that color preferences are determined by people's preferences for correspondingly colored objects/entities (Palmer & Schloss in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107:8877-8882, 2010). They further suggest that color preferences are calculated at a given moment, depending on which color-object associations are currently most activated or salient. Color preferences are thus far more dynamic and context-dependent than has previously been believed.
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Efficient processing of the visual world requires that distracting items be avoided, or at least rapidly disengaged from. The mechanisms by which highly salient, yet irrelevant, stimuli lead to distraction, however, are not well understood. Here, we utilized a particularly strong type of distractor--images of human faces--to investigate the mechanisms of distraction and the involuntarily biasing of attention. ⋯ Our results thus demonstrate two distinct mechanisms contributing to distraction: an initial involuntary capture to any sudden event and a subsequent holding of attention to a potentially meaningful, yet task-irrelevant stimulus-in this case, a human face. Critically, the latter holding of attention by faces was not unique to fearful faces but also occurred for neutral faces. The present results dissociate attentional capture from hold in another way as well, since the capture occurred regardless of the nature of the distractors, but the extended holding of attention was dependent upon the ongoing distractor context.