Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience
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Front Behav Neurosci · Jan 2015
ReviewDissecting Alzheimer disease in Down syndrome using mouse models.
Down syndrome (DS) is a common genetic condition caused by the presence of three copies of chromosome 21 (trisomy 21). This greatly increases the risk of Alzheimer disease (AD), but although virtually all people with DS have AD neuropathology by 40 years of age, not all develop dementia. ⋯ Here, we consider key characteristics of human AD in DS (AD-DS), and our current state of knowledge on related phenotypes in AD and DS mouse models. We go on to review important features needed in future models of AD-DS, to understand this type of dementia and so highlight pathogenic mechanisms relevant to all populations at risk of AD.
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Front Behav Neurosci · Jan 2015
ReviewChoking under pressure: the neuropsychological mechanisms of incentive-induced performance decrements.
In contrast to the assumption of efficiency wage models, which state that wage incentives should be positively correlated with productivity, high incentives may produce performance decrements in real life scenarios. Such a "choking under pressure" phenomenon exemplifies how psychological stress can profoundly shape human behavior, for good or for bad. ⋯ This review aims to identify psychological factors that determine choking and the neural underpinnings of these processes. Insights into how incentives influence performance may aid engineering training regimens and interventions that equip individuals to better handle high-stakes-induced psychological stress, and to thrive under stress.
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Front Behav Neurosci · Jan 2015
ReviewPain perception in people with Down syndrome: a synthesis of clinical and experimental research.
People with an intellectual disability experience both acute and chronic pain with at least the same frequency as the general population. However, considerably less is known about the pain perception of people with Down syndrome. In this review paper, we evaluated the available clinical and experimental evidence. ⋯ Taken together, the literature suggests that people with Down syndrome experience pain, both acute and chronic, with at least the same frequency as the rest of the population. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that although acute pain expression appears to be delayed, once pain is registered, there appears to be a magnified pain response. We conclude by proposing an agenda for future research in this area.
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Front Behav Neurosci · Jan 2015
Contingency Awareness Shapes Acquisition and Extinction of Emotional Responses in a Conditioning Model of Pain-Related Fear.
As a fundamental learning process, fear conditioning promotes the formation of associations between predictive cues and biologically significant signals. In its application to pain, conditioning may provide important insight into mechanisms underlying pain-related fear, although knowledge especially in interoceptive pain paradigms remains scarce. Furthermore, while the influence of contingency awareness on excitatory learning is subject of ongoing debate, its role in pain-related acquisition is poorly understood and essentially unknown regarding extinction as inhibitory learning. ⋯ Our findings underscore specific roles of learned danger and safety in pain-related acquisition and extinction. Contingency accuracy appears to distinctly impact learned emotional responses to safety and danger cues, supporting aversive learning to occur independently from CS-US awareness. The interplay of cognitive and emotional factors in shaping excitatory and inhibitory pain-related learning may contribute to altered pain processing, underscoring its clinical relevance in chronic pain.
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Involuntary movements share much of the motor control circuitry used for voluntary movement, yet the two can be easily distinguished. The Kohnstamm phenomenon (where a sustained, hard push produces subsequent involuntary arm raising) is a useful experimental model for exploring differences between voluntary and involuntary movement. Both central and peripheral accounts have been proposed, but little is known regarding how the putative Kohnstamm generator responds to afferent input. ⋯ Comparison to matched voluntary movements revealed a preserved stretch response when a Kohnstamm movement first contacts an obstacle, and also an overestimation of the perceived contact force. Our findings support a hybrid central and peripheral account of the Kohnstamm phenomenon. The strange subjective experience of this involuntary movement is consistent with the view that movement awareness depends strongly on efference copies, but that the Kohnstamm generator does not produces efference copies.