• Barbara Springer Edwards.
• J Clin Ethics. 1991 Jan 1; 2 (2): 107.

AbstractErich H. Loewy proposes to elevate the moral obligation to prevent and relieve suffering to the level of a prima facie moral duty by delineating which beings are of primary moral worth and which are of secondary moral worth. Sentient beings have a capacity to suffer and are therefore of primary moral worth. Beings that are insentient cannot suffer; therefore such beings are only of secondary moral worth. Objects of secondary moral worth include patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) and brain-dead patients. This proposal, he says, would solve a number of problems in clinical bioethics. First, it would help to clarify our moral duties at the bedside. And secondly, by creating a hierarchy of moral values, it helps to differentiate which patients are owed our primary allegiance and resources. Despite his extensive and painstaking proof, I believe several questions remain about the use of the "capacity of sentient beings to suffer" as a basis for a universal grounding in ethics.

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