• Dana Tulodziecki.
• Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC), 222 Cockefair Hall, 5100 Rockhill Road, Kansas City, MO 64110, USA. tulodzieckid@umkc.edu
• Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2011 Sep 1;42(3):306-16.

AbstractIn the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or 'exciting cause' of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera's cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera's origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,-data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues-, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or if, it was passed on. The question then arises as to how Snow arrived at conclusions so systematically different from those of his opponents. In this paper, I want to look at Snow's reasoning in some detail, and show that there were certain principles, explanatory power in particular, that were epistemologically important to Snow in their own right. I will show that Snow himself takes explanatory power to be an epistemic property, and makes explicit links between explanatory power and confirmation. Systematically juxtaposing Snow's claims and his opponents', I will show that Snow was right to tout the explanatory power of his theory, and that his conclusions about the epistemic superiority of his theory over that of the miasmatists' were justified.Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

14 keywords...

hide…