Journal of evaluation in clinical practice
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Despite the at least decades long record of philosophical recognition and interest, the intricacy of the deceptively familiar appearing concepts of 'disease', 'disorder', 'disability', and so forth, has only recently begun showing itself with clarity in the popular discourse wherein its newly emerging prominence stems from the liberties and restrictions contingent upon it. Whether a person is deemed to be afflicted by a disease or a disorder governs their ability to access health care, be it free at the point of use or provided by an insurer; it also influences the treatment of individuals by the judicial system and employers; it even affects one's own perception of self. ⋯ Using a series of presently contentious cases illustrate the power of the proposed framework which is capable of providing actionable and humane solutions to problems that leave the current theories confounded.
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Since non-directed (altruistic) kidney donors do not stand to benefit from the lengthening and strengthening of a relationship that they intrinsically value, their donations are considered to constitute the most altruistic variety of living kidney donation. ⋯ Accordingly, the expected value of becoming a living kidney donor is likely to be positive, meaning the act of doing so may be considered akin to the taking out of an insurance policy. In the context of non-directed (altruistic) kidney donation, this may diminish the extent to which such a donation is considered altruistic.
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There are high hopes that clinical decisions can be improved by adopting algorithms trained to estimate the likelihood that a patient suffers a condition C. Introducing work on the epistemic value of purely statistical evidence in legal epistemology I show that a certain type of AI devices for making medical decisions about persons rely on purely statistical evidence and that it raises an important question about the appropriateness of relying on such devices for allocating health resources. If the argument I present is sound, then it suggests a radical rethinking of the use of prevalent types of AI devices as well as the use of statistical evidence in medical practice more generally.
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Narrative Medicine (NM) and Indigenous Story Medicine both use narrative to understand and effect health, but their respective conceptualizations of narrative differ. ⋯ I call for more scholars to take up different narratives to further investigate the ethical space between NM and Indigenous Story Medicine.
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When one is seriously ill, the diagnosis given can generate questions about what it means and how to make sense of it. This is particularly the case for psychiatric diagnoses which can convey a biomedical narrative of the sufferer's condition. Making sense of one's diagnosis in such cases can involve changing one's self-narrative in such a way as to incorporate the belief that one has developed a disease with an unknown cause. ⋯ I argue that those receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may consequently be vulnerable to epistemic injustice. In particular, this includes hermeneutical injustice, where individuals lack the ability to understand or articulate their experiences in ways that make sense to them, due to their hermeneutical resources being marginalised by the dominant narrative in a medicalized environment. I consider two possible objections to my claim and offer answers to these.