Frontiers in psychology
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2012
Computational Grounded Cognition: a new alliance between grounded cognition and computational modeling.
Grounded theories assume that there is no central module for cognition. According to this view, all cognitive phenomena, including those considered the province of amodal cognition such as reasoning, numeric, and language processing, are ultimately grounded in (and emerge from) a variety of bodily, affective, perceptual, and motor processes. The development and expression of cognition is constrained by the embodiment of cognitive agents and various contextual factors (physical and social) in which they are immersed. ⋯ Still, there are very few explicit computational models that implement grounding in sensory, motor and affective processes as intrinsic to cognition, and demonstrate that grounded theories can mechanistically implement higher cognitive abilities. We propose a new alliance between grounded cognition and computational modeling toward a novel multidisciplinary enterprise: Computational Grounded Cognition. We clarify the defining features of this novel approach and emphasize the importance of using the methodology of Cognitive Robotics, which permits simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of grounding, embodiment, and situatedness, showing how they constrain the development and expression of cognition.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2012
Intentional suppression can lead to a reduction of memory strength: behavioral and electrophysiological findings.
Previous research has shown that the intentional suppression of unwanted memories can lead to forgetting in later memory tests. However, the mechanisms underlying this effect remain unclear. This study employed recognition memory testing and event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate whether intentional suppression leads to the inhibition of memory representations at an item level. ⋯ Furthermore, ERPs to no-think items from 225 to 450 ms were more negative-going in later phases of the experiment, suggesting a gradual reduction of memory strength with repeated suppression attempts. These effects were dissociable from correlates of recollection (500-600 ms) and inhibitory control (450-500 ms) that did not vary over the time-course of the experiment and appeared to be under strategic control. Our results give strong evidence that the no-think manipulation involves inhibition of memory representations at an item level.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2012
Resting state networks and consciousness: alterations of multiple resting state network connectivity in physiological, pharmacological, and pathological consciousness States.
In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia), and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed resting state networks were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains mainly in terms of hypothesis-driven seed-based correlation analysis and data-driven independent components analysis approaches. ⋯ At the clinical level, we acknowledge the technical merits of the resting state paradigm. Indeed, fast and easy acquisitions are preferable to activation paradigms in clinical populations. Finally, we emphasize the need to validate the diagnostic and prognostic value of fMRI resting state measurements in non-communicating brain damaged patients.
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We are able to extract detailed information from mental images that we were not explicitly aware of during encoding. For example, we can discover a new figure when we rotate a previously seen image in our mind. However, such discoveries are not "really" new but just new "interpretations." In two recent publications, we have shown that mental imagery can lead to perceptual learning (Tartaglia et al., 2009, 2012). ⋯ In this sense, perceptual learning via mental imagery exceeds new discoveries in mental images. Still, the effects of mental imagery on perceptual learning are limited. Only perception can lead to really new perceptual experience.
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Frontiers in psychology · Jan 2012
Faces in context: a review and systematization of contextual influences on affective face processing.
Facial expressions are of eminent importance for social interaction as they convey information about other individuals' emotions and social intentions. According to the predominant "basic emotion" approach, the perception of emotion in faces is based on the rapid, automatic categorization of prototypical, universal expressions. Consequently, the perception of facial expressions has typically been investigated using isolated, de-contextualized, static pictures of facial expressions that maximize the distinction between categories. ⋯ The studies reviewed here demonstrate that perception and neural processing of facial expressions are substantially modified by contextual information, including verbal, visual, and auditory information presented together with the face as well as knowledge or processing biases already present in the observer. These findings further challenge the assumption of automatic, hardwired categorical emotion extraction mechanisms predicted by basic emotion theories. Taking into account a recent model on face processing, we discuss where and when these different contextual influences may take place, thus outlining potential avenues in future research.